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Antitrust
by Michael Eric Ross*
and
Jeffrey S. Cashdan**
The Eleventh Circuit's 1999 term was unremarkable for its antitrust
jurisprudence. The court published only three antitrust decisions.1
2
I. MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp.

MCA Television Ltd. ("MCA"), which licenses syndicated television
shows, brought an action asserting breach of contract and copyright
infringement claims against Public Interest Corp. ("PIC"), its licensee
which owns a television station. PIC counterclaimed, alleging breach of
contract and violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. PIC maintained
that MCA unlawfully conditioned licensing of several of its television
shows, in exchange for advertising time, on PIC's willingness to license
episodes of another show (Harry and the Hendersons), for cash as well
as advertising time. PIC reluctantly agreed to this arrangement,
contending it would not have chosen to license Harry and the Hendersons if it had not been forced to do so as a condition of obtaining the
* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida (A.B.,
1971); Harvard University (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Claremont McKenna
College (B.A., 1987); University of Chicago (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bars of Georgia
and Illinois.
The views expressed in this Article are the personal opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of King & Spalding or any of its clients.
1. Morton's Market, Inc. v. Gustafson's Dairy, Inc. 198 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 1999); Lowell
v. American Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); MCA Television Ltd. v. Public
Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999). A fourth decision, Laker Airways, Inc. v.
British Airways, PLC, 182 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1999), involved an antitrust action, but the
opinion concerned application of FED. R. CIV. P. 19 and did not turn on application of
substantive antitrust law. Id. at 847-50. Accordingly, this opinion is not discussed in this
article.
2. 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999).
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licenses for the other shows it desired. PIC alleged this arrangement
constituted per se unlawful tying.3
After a bench trial, the district court held that PIC had breached its
licensing contracts with MCA and had willfully infringed MCA's
copyrights. As for PIC's antitrust counterclaim, the district court held
that the licensing arrangement constituted unlawful tying, but that PIC
had failed to prove it suffered any "antitrust injury" to support its claim
for damages.4
PIC appealed the lower court's judgment on MCA's breach of contract
and copyright infringement claims and on the issue of damages for the
antitrust violation. MCA cross-appealed the antitrust liability judgment.
As to the contract claims, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the liability
finding and remanded the case for reconsideration of damages. 5 The
appellate court followed the same course for the antitrust counterclaim,
affirming the liability ruling and remanding for reconsideration of
damages.'
As to the antitrust claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that MCA's
arrangement constituted "block booking," which the Supreme Court long
ago deemed per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 Block
booking occurs when copyrighted material is sold only as a package and
the licensee must accept an unwanted license in the package to obtain
the license sought.' The challenged arrangement here was a clear case
of block booking. As such, the court properly held that it could not
depart from established Supreme Court precedent despite increasing
momentum in antitrust circles to re-evaluate certain per se unlawful
practices under the rule of reason. Indeed, reasonable arguments can be
made that the presumption of market power inherent in the view that
all block booking arrangements are per se unlawful is flawed, and that
case-by-case factual analysis is necessary to properly gauge the
competitive effects of a particular arrangement. Until the Supreme
Court accepts such arguments (or Congress steps into the fray), the
Eleventh Circuit's hands are tied.9

3. Id. at 1267-69.
4. Id. at 1269.
5. Id. at 1276.
6. Id. at 1281.
7. Id. at 1276-79 (citing United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 50 (1962); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948)).
8. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (holding that retail maximum price
maintenance, formerly per se unlawful, should be analyzed under the rule of reason).
9. Disagreeing with the lower court's determination that PIC did not show an "antitrust
injury," the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision as it related to the cash
portion of the Harryand the Hendersons contract and remanded the case for a determina-
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Morton's Market, Inc. v. Gustafson's Dairy, Inc."°

This case principally concerned application of the statute of limitations
to a price-fixing action. A group of milk retailers brought suit against
milk producers for price-fixing in Florida. Defendants contended that
the private actions were time barred because most of the allegedly
unlawful conduct had occurred more than four years prior to initiation
of the private lawsuit. Plaintiffs contended that the statute of limitations had not expired because it did not start to run until four years
prior to filing of the suit and because the statute of limitations had been
tolled. The district court granted a motion for summary judgment,
accepting all of defendants' arguments."
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 12 First, the court held that
evidence supported the view that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until less than four years before the filing of the action because
of the continuing nature of the alleged antitrust conspiracy, thus
bringing the case within the applicable statute of limitations.13 The
court thus found that a jury issue existed as to whether the statute of
limitations had expired. 4
Second, the Eleventh Circuit held that even if the statute of limitations had run in whole or in part as to plaintiffs' claims, it may have
been tolled for two reasons.'5 Initially, the court considered statutory
tolling. The court held that because plaintiffs' private action was
brought within one year of a government investigation that bore a "real
relationship" to the claims raised by plaintiffs' action, the statute of
limitations had been tolled.'" The court explained that pursuant to
Section 16(i) of the Clayton Act,'7 private plaintiffs have one year from
the expiration of a government action to bring a private action that
bears a real relationship to the government's case.'"
The court

tion on the question of whether PIC could successfully prove it had suffered tangible
financial harm as a result of the agreement's anticompetitive effects. 171 F.3d at 1281.
The court ruled that PIC may have suffered injury as a result of lost opportunities to fill
the time slot allotted to Harry and the Hendersons with alternative programming. Id. at
1279-81.
10. 198 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 826-27.
12. Id. at 827.

13. Id. at 827-29 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1994)).
14. Id. at 829.
15. Id. at 829-37.
16. Id. at 831-32.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1994).
18. 198 F.3d 829-30.
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concluded that the price-fixing claims of the private plaintiffs were
sufficiently related to the bid-rigging claims of the government to satisfy
the requirements of Section 16(i). 19
This aspect of the Eleventh Circuit's decision appears correct in result.
The government's bid-rigging, claim and the private parties' price-fixing
claims bear a substantial relationship to each other-same defendants,
same product, same time period, and essentially the same conduct (fixing
prices). Because "both suits set up substantially the same claims, "2
the Eleventh Circuit's ruling appears correct. The language used by the
Eleventh Circuit,; however, is a bit too broad. The Eleventh Circuit
stated that the government's bid-rigging claims and the private
plaintiffs' price-fixing conspiracy claims bear a real relationship to each
other, in part, because both alleged that the milk manufacturers
"engaged in collusive behavior designed to eliminate competition." 21 Of
course, if this were the appropriate standard, then any antitrust
lawsuits involving similar defendants and time periods would satisfy
Section 16(i) because all antitrust lawsuits concern allegations of the
elimination of competition.
The court next considered equitable tolling, particularly for stale
damages claims. While the court determined that plaintiffs were
entitled to bring the action, an issue remained as to whether they could
pursue damages for allegedly unlawful transactions that occurred more
than four years prior to initiation of their lawsuit.2 2 Plaintiffs contended that because defendants had fraudulently concealed their conspiracy,
plaintiffs were entitled to pursue damages for sales that occurred more
than four years prior to the initiation of their lawsuit. Defendants
moved for summary judgment on the damages claims, and the district
court granted the motion on the grounds that plaintiffs had notice of the
price-fixing conspiracy and had failed to act with reasonable diligence to
pursue their claims.23
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on this issue as well.2 4 The court held
that information concerning the prior bid-rigging investigation by the
government was insufficient to support a conclusion as a matter of law
that plaintiffs previously were or should have been on notice of their

19.
20.
(1965).
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 831.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 323
198 F.3d at 830-31.
Id.
Id. at 827.
Id.
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price-fixing claims.25 The court recognized that such information may
have provided notice to plaintiffs, but concluded that a factual issue
existed; thus, a jury trial was required.2" The Eleventh Circuit further
rejected the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' failure to conduct
any investigation during the period in question into whether they had
price-fixing claims to raise against defendants required rejection of their
fraudulent concealment argument."
The Eleventh Circuit again
concluded that a factual issue remained as to whether there was
sufficient evidence available to plaintiffs that would have led them to
discover such claims.2 8 Furthermore, the court held that the lack of
any prior investigation was irrelevant to this central fact question.29
In light of the procedural posture of the matter--on motion for summary
judgment-the Eleventh Circuit resolved all doubt in favor of plaintiffs
and concluded
that sufficient factual issues remained to require a
30
trial.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly
concluded that one defendant withdrew from the conspiracy more than
four years prior to plaintiffs' initiation of their lawsuit."' The court
ruled that this defendant's sale of its business effectively constituted
withdrawal from the alleged conspiracy and, thus, insulated that
defendant from any liability based on overt acts of the conspirators
following its withdrawal.3 2 Accordingly, as to this defendant, the court
held that plaintiffs' action was time barred. 3
III.

Lowell v. American Cyanamid
Co. 4

Lowell involved an alleged vertical resale price maintenance agreement. A group of farmers filed suit against American Cyanamid
Company claiming that American Cyanamid and its dealers agreed to
fix the retail price for certain crop-protection products.3 5 American
Cyanamid moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the farmers,
who purchased the products at issue from the dealers, lacked standing

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 833.
Id. at 832-37.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Id.
177 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1228-29.
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to bring a suit solely against American Cyanamid under the indirect6
The district
purchaser rule articulated in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois."
3
"
court granted the motion to dismiss.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, explaining that Illinois Brick does not
apply to vertical conspiracy claims when there is no "pass-on" of the
alleged overcharge.38 This conclusion is correct. Illinois Brick involved
claims that concrete block manufacturers had fixed prices of blocks sold
to masonry contractors, who in turn sold the blocks to general contractors, who then used them in buildings sold to plaintiffs.39 Motivated by
concerns of duplicate recoveries and overly complicated litigation about
apportioning damages that might result if indirect purchasers were
allowed to assert antitrust claims against horizontal conspirators, the
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick concluded it would be unfair and
inefficient to allow indirect purchasers to pursue horizontal conspiracy
claims.4 ° Instead, the Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers
have standing to raise these claims.41 As the Eleventh Circuit noted,
however, these concerns are not implicated in vertical resale price
maintenance cases when the plaintiff purchases directly from an alleged
conspirator." In such cases, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries
or murky apportionment disputes because the consumer-plaintiff is the
only party who has paid the overcharge. Although the manufacturer in
Lowell did not sell directly to the consumer-plaintiff, plaintiff properly
had standing to sue the manufacturer because the manufacturer
allegedly conspired with the direct-selling dealer and was, therefore,
43
jointly and severally liable with the dealer for the consumer's injury.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit properly rejected defendants' contention and
reinstated the claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's antitrust docket for 1999 was extremely light,
and the decisions issued were uneventful. This light antitrust docket is
somewhat surprising given the general explosion in government and
private antitrust enforcement in this circuit at the district court level.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

431 U.S. 720, 730-31 (1977).
177 F.3d at 1228.
Id. at 1229, 1230.
431 U.S. at 726-27.
Id. at 730-32.

41.

Id.

42.

177 F.3d at 1230-31.
Id. at 1230 (citing PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 264

43.

(revised ed. 1995)).
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This light docket may be aberrational, or it may signal a trend towards
resolution of complex antitrust cases at the lower court level, where the
cost of litigation and risk of an adverse judgment motivates litigants to
resolve cases relatively quickly, if possible.
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*
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